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HEALTH CARE WORKERS WITH AIDS: 
DUTIES, RIGHTS, AND POTENTIAL TORT LIABILITY 
Gary I. Strausbergt 
Randal D. Getz:/: 
Since 1981, nearly 250,000 acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) cases have been diagnosed in the United States.' Of these 
infected individuals, the Centers for Disease Control know of 8,871 
persons2 that were health care workers. 3 This number includes two 
hundred forty-three persons in the dental field, nine hundred three 
physicians, sixty-six surgeons, one hundred twenty paramedics, and 
one thousand nine hundred thirty-seven nurses.4 These numbers are 
likely to grow on all counts as the AIDS criSis matures, for an 
estimated one million Americans are infected with the human im-
munodeficiency virus (HIV) which causes AIDS.s 
t B.A., cum laude, 1969, Brooklyn College; J.D., with honors, 1972, George 
Washington University; LL.M., 1975, Harvard University; Partner, Janet & 
Strausberg, Baltimore, Maryland; Adjunct Professor of Law, Univesity of 
Maryland Law School. 
t B.A., 1985, Johns Hopkins University; M.D., 1989, University of Maryland; 
J.D., magna cum laude, 1992, California Western School of Law; Associate, 
Janet & Strausberg, Baltimore, Maryland. 
1. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV / AIDS SURVEILLANCE REpORT 6 (Feb. 
1993) (showing in Table 1 that as of December 1992, state and local health 
departments had reported to the Centers for Disease Control 244,939 AIDS 
cases among persons of all ages in the United States). 
2. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, FACTS ABOUT HIV / AIDS AND HEALTH-CARE 
WORKERS (Dec. 1992) ("Of the persons reported with AIDS in the United 
States through September 30, 1992, 8,871 had been employed in health care 
... represent[ing] 4.80/0 of the 184; 163 AIDS cases ... for whom occupational 
information was known. "). 
3. The Centers for Disease Control have defined health care workers as "persons, 
including students and trainees, whose activities involve contact with patients 
or with blood or other body fluids from patients in a health-care setting." 
Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 
36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REp. IS, 3S (Supp. 1987). Morbidity & 
Mortality Weekly Report is a weekly publication of the Centers for Disease 
Control, a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
4. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, FACTS ABOUT HIV / AIDS AND HEALTH-CARE 
WORKERS (Dec. 1992) ("The type of job is known for 8,468 (96%) of the 
8,871 reported health-care workers with AIDS .... Overall, 74% of the health-
care workers with AIDS, including 660 physicians, 50 surgeons, 186 dental 
workers, 1,390 nurses, and 120 paramedics, are reported to have died."). 
5. Estimates of HIV Prevalence and Projected AIDS Cases: Summary of a 
Workshop, October 31 - November 1, 1989, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REp. 110, 110 (1990). 
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In 1983, the Centers for Disease Control published guidelines 
for health care workers and others in order to reduce the risk of 
HIV / AIDS transmission.6 Nevertheless, instances of transmission by 
health care workers have not dissipated and the disease itself has 
increased in epidemic proportions. 7 
The etiologic agent of AIDS, HIV, is communicable by blood 
transfers and sexual activity. On occasion, health care workers have 
contracted HIV via contact with blood in the workplace. To date, 
more than thirty-three health care workers have been infected by 
HIV while performing work related duties. Of them, twenty-eight 
have been infected through needle sticks, four through exposure of 
the eyes, nose, or mouth, and one through an open-skin wound. 8 
Likewise, HIV -infected physicians or nurses also have the ca-
pability of passing the disease to patients. In 1985, the Centers for 
Disease Control announced guidelines which spoke of this danger: 
[A] risk of transmission of [HIV] from health care workers 
to patients would exist in situations where there is both (1) 
a high degree of trauma to the patient that would provide 
a portal of entry for the virus (e.g., during invasive proce-
dures) and (2) access of blood or serous fluid from the 
infected health care worker to the open tissue of a patient, 
as would occur if the health care worker sustains a needle 
stick or scalpel injury during an invasive procedure.9 
6. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Precautions jor Health-Care 
Workers and Allied Projessionals, 32 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 
450, 450-52 (1983). 
7. "Epidemic" is most broadly defined as "an extensive outbreak or period of 
unusually high incidence of a disease in a community or area." BLAKISTON'S 
GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 256 (4th ed. 1979). For a discussion of how AIDS 
grew to epidemic proportions, see RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: 
POLITICS, PEOPLE AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987). 
8. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 19 (Feb. 
1993) (Table 15 showing that as of December 1992 a total of thirty-three 
health-care workers with documented acquired AIDS/HIV infection and sixty-
nine with possible occupational transmission); see also Update: Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus Injections in Health-Care Workers Exposed to Blood oj 
Injected Patients, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REp. 285, 285-88 (1987) 
(giving case histories of three health-care workers infected with HIV I AIDS in 
a workplace setting). 
9. Recommendations jor Preventing Transmission oj Injection with Human T-
Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Work-
place, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REp. 686, 689-95 (1985), reprinted 
in CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, AIDS RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDELINES, 
NOVEMBER 1982-DECEMBER 1987, at 8 (1988). 
1992] Health Care Workers with AIDS 287 
This risk has materialized,lo and in response there have been increas-
ing concerns about the rights and responsibilities of health care 
workers with AIDS.l1 
This Article will examine whether an HIV -infected health care 
worker can be held liable in tort for infecting a patient with AIDS 
or causing a fear of such an infection. First, the Article discusses 
the ethical background against which the actions of health care 
workers in general, and physicians in particular, are judged. Next, 
the Article examines various theories of tort liability, including bat-
tery, misrepresentation, strict liability, and negligence. Included under 
the negligence analysis is a discussion of a physician's duty to disclose 
to the patient information concerning his or her HIV status and the 
countervailing confidentiality concerns that AIDS raises. Finally, the 
Article concludes with a discussion of whether a patient's fear of 
contracting AIDS from an HIV -positive physician may also be com-
pensable under the theories of intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. 
I. THEORETICAL ETHICS FOR A REAL PROBLEM 
In 1988, the American Medical Association issued a policy 
statement declaring that "a physician who knows that he or she is 
seropositive [for HIV], should not engage in any activity that creates 
a risk of transmission of the disease to others." 12 In the same year, 
the State Medical Board of Ohio AIDS Committee went a step 
further in recommending that "any licensee infected with the AIDS 
virus must inform his/her professional colleagues ... for the purpose 
of assessing the potential danger to patients being treated. . . . [A] 
seropositive physician shall not engage in any activity that creates a 
risk of transmission."13 These policy recommendations were issued 
10. See, e.g., William F. Zorzi, Jr., & Jonathan Bor, Baltimore Prison Dentist 
Dies oj AIDS, BALTIMORE SUN, May 23, 1991, at lA. 
11. The AIDS epidemic has already generated a number of cases dealing with 
blood transfusions. See, e.g., Miles Labs., Inc. v. Doe, 315 Md. 704, 556 A.2d 
1107 (1989) (finding that blood and bloodproducts were not unreasonably 
dangerous products); see also Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., 927 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 
1991) (holding that a blood-clotting agent, "Koyne," was not an unreasonably 
dangerous product, and, therefore, manufacturers were not strictly liable to 
the patient who contracted AIDS). 
12. Lawrence Gostin, HIV-InJected Physicians and the Practice oj Seriously In-
vasive Procedures, HASTINGS CENTER REp., Jan./Feb. 1989, at 32 (citing 
American Medical Association, Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs, Ethical Issues Involved in the Growing AIDS Crisis, 259 JAMA 1360, 
1361 (1988». 
13. AIDS REFERENCE GUIDE: A SOURCE BOOK FOR PLANNERS AND DECISION MAKERS 
2 (Michael E. Carbine & Michele Welsing, eds., 1988). 
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before there were any documented cases of health care workers 
infecting patients. Today, however, it is known that at least five 
patients have been infected by a Florida dentist.14 
The problems, concerns, and timeliness of this issue are illus-
trated by the story of Dr. Victor J. Luckritz. Dr. Luckritz, the chief 
dentist at the Maryland Penitentiary, died of AIDS on May 7, 1991. 15 
Dr. Luckritz was accused of not wearing gloves while performing 
procedures on some of the prisoners he treated. 16 It also was claimed 
that he worked with visible sores on his hands. 17 
Without considering the truth or falsity of the allegations against 
Dr. Luckritz, the situation illustrates the complexity of the issues 
involved. Did Dr. Luckritz have a duty to reveal his HIV status to 
his patients? Alternatively, did the dentist have a right to maintain 
his privacy with regard to this illness? Since prison populations 
14. See Possible Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to a Patient 
During an Invasive Dental Procedure, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REp. 
489,489-93 (1990) (reporting the possible transmission of HIV from an AIDS-
infected dentist to his patient during an invasive dental procedure); Update: 
Transmission of HIV to a Patient During an Invasive Dental Procedure -
Florida, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REp. 21, 21-33 (1991) (reporting 
a follow-up investigation which identified four additional patients of the dentist 
who were infected with HIV). 
One of the infected patients, Ms. Kimberly Bergalis, championed the 
patient's right to know of a health care worker's infection with AIDS. The 
Centers for Disease Control have faced a number of roadblocks in attempting 
to learn how these patients were infected by the Florida dentist, Dr. David 
Acer. See Donald C. Drake, How Patients Got AIDS From Dentist Unresolved, 
BALTIMORE SUN, June 22, 1991, at lA (reporting on the difficulties of the 
Florida investigation as delivered in the findings of Mr. Harold Jaffe, chief 
investigator and epidemiologist at the Centers for Disease Control, at the 
Seventh International Conference on AIDS in Florence, Italy). All five "had 
undergone tooth extractions or root canal work-procedures involving sharp 
instruments that could cut tissue in the mouth, leaving it open to contamination 
with infected blood." Id. Dr. Acer also did not wear gloves while working 
until 1987. Id. However, in light of the recent Centers for Disease Control 
calculation that there is "only one chance in 42,000 of an infected surgeon 
giving the [AIDS] virus to a patient during an operation," one is lead to take 
a suspicious view of Dr. Acer's practices. Id. 
In related stories, a Maryland dentist, Dr. Victor J. Luckritz, who treated 
1,893 inmates in the Maryland Penitentiary between June 1988 and April 1990, 
died of AIDS on May 7, 1991. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
Also, a Maryland breast cancer surgeon, Dr. Rudolph Almaraz, who treated 
over 1,800 patients since January 1984, died of AIDS on November 16, 1990. 
A number of lawsuits related to this case have been filed and will be discussed 
at length later in this article. See infra notes 132-44 and accompanying text. 
15. See William F. Zorzi, Jr., & Jonathan Bor, Baltimore Prison Dentist Dies of 
AIDS, BALTIMORE SUN, May 23, 1991, at lA; William F. Zorzi, Jr., & Jonathan 
Bor, 1,893 Prisoners Treated by Dentist Who Died of AIDS, BALTIMORE SUN, 
May 30, 1991, at lB. 
16. See William F. Zorzi, Jr., & Jonathan Bor, Baltimore Prison Dentist Dies of 
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include individuals at high-risk for HIV infection,18 how easily can 
one prove causation under these circumstances? Further, should the 
invasiveness of the procedure determine the health care worker's right 
to privacy concerning this illness? 
This Article proposes that there should be some form of tort 
liability for a health care worker who does not disclose his or her 
HIV positive status to a patient before performing "physically 
invasive" 19 techniques. Infected health care workers, however, should 
not be denied the right to continue practicing in their field. Because 
AIDS is considered to be a handicap within the meaning of the 
Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973,20 it is believed that "[P]hysicians, 
then, have a right under federal [law] ... not to be denied the right 
to practice medicine or to be reassigned to an administrative position 
unless there is a significant risk of HIV transmission. "21 
Thus there is a "need for balance between a physician's rights 
and a patient's safety."22 This balance is likely to be shaped by 
future Centers for Disease Control recommendations and by judicial 
decisions considering whether to assign liability to health care workers 
AIDS, BALTIMORE SUN, May 23,1991, at lA; William F. Zorzi, Jr., & Jonathan 
Bor, 1,893 Prisoners Treated by Dentist Who Died of AIDS, BALTIMORE SUN, 
May 30, 1991, at lB. 
17. See William F. Zorzi, Jr., & Jonathan Bor, Baltimore Prison Dentist Dies of 
AIDS, BALTIMORE SUN, May 23,1991, at lA; William F. Zorzi, Jr., & Jonathan 
Bor, 1,893 Prisoners Treated by Dentist Who Died of AIDS, BALTIMORE SUN, 
May 30, 1991, at lB. 
18. Jonathan Bor, Tracing Prisoners with AIDS from Dentist a Huge Task, 
BALTIMORE SUN, May 24, 1991, at IB (reporting on a 1988 study by the Johns 
Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health that found 8.1070 of Maryland 
state prison inmates were infected with the HIV virus). 
19. The Centers for Disease Control define "exposure-prone invasive procedures" 
as "procedures during which there is a recognized risk for percutaneous injury 
to the health care worker (HCW), and if such an injury occurs, the HCW's 
blood is likely to contact the patient's body cavity, subcutaneous tissues, and/ 
or mucous membranes." Process for Identifying Exposure-Prone Procedure, 
40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REp. 565, 565 (1991). 
20. See Chalk v. Orange County Dep't of Educ., 832 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(although handicapped because of AIDS, plaintiff otherwise was qualified to 
perform his job under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 
794, as amended); Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. 
Fla. 1986); see also Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (lith Cir. 1991) (teacher 
with AIDS determined to be handicapped but "otherwise qualified to perform 
his job" under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). 
Similarly, HIV -infected health care workers are considered disabled under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, made effective July 26, 1992, 
which prohibits employment discrimination based on a disability. See Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990). 
21. Gostin, supra note 12, at 37. 
22. Id. at 37 (citing Doe v. Cook County Hosp., No. 87 C 6888 (N.D. Ill. consent 
decree filed Feb. 21, 1988». 
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who expose their patients to AIDS. The social policy which ultimately 
emerges should be one which places a premium on preserving human 
life and preventing all possibility of HIV transmission from health 
care worker to patient. At the same time, the dignity and quality of 
life of the infected health care worker who still wants to practice 
should be maintained and respected. 
II. TORT LIABILITY 
Tortious conduct can often give rise to different causes of action. 
Although one set of operative facts produces one distinct harm, a 
number of different legal theories may arise. Common causes of 
action arising out of tortious conduct are battery, misrepresentation, 
strict liability, negligence, infliction of emotional distress, and, in 
medical settings, lack of informed consent. Each of these causes of 
actions will be examined, with the conclusion that negligence is the 
most viable theory for a patient claiming infection from an HIV-
infected health care worker. 
A. Battery 
Battery is the intentional touching of another person in an 
offensive and unauthorized manner.23 Physicians have been held liable 
under a battery theory in situations where a doctor obtained consent 
to perform one procedure and instead performed a substantially 
different procedure.24 Even when the consented-to operation was very 
similar to the actual operation that was performed, courts have 
concluded that a battery action was proper.25 
Liability under a battery theory may also obtain when an un-
disclosed potential complication results from medical treatment. 26 For 
instance, a battery action was sustained by an Ohio court when a 
physician failed to warn of the danger of radiation burns from 
therapy.27 Similarly, a physician's failure to warn a patient that a 
spinal operation involved a risk of permanent paralysis was consid-
ered a battery in Pennsylvania. 28 By analogy, the argument may be 
made that the transmission of the AIDS virus from doctor to patient 
23. RESTATEMENT (SEco~m) OF TORTS § 18 (1965). 
24. See, e.g., Corn v. French, 289 P.2d 173, 174 (Nev. 1955) (patient consented 
to exploratory surgery; doctor performed mastectomy); see also Zoterell v. 
Repp, 153 N.W. 692 (Mich. 1915) (consent given for hernia. operation during 
which both ovaries were also removed). 
25. See Bailey v. Belinfante, 218 S.E.2d 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (plaintiff brought 
action charging defendant dentist with battery and negligent extraction of all 
the plaintiff's teeth without consent). 
26. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d I, 7 (Cal. 1972). 
27. Belcher v. Carter, 234 N.E.2d 311, 312 n.27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967). 
28. See Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 667 (Pa. 1966). 
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during an operative procedure, when there was no adequate warning, 
may also be a battery. 
In instances of inadequate disclosure, most courts have held that 
liability is a result of negligence. 29 A number of significant conse-
quences, however, result from relying on a negligence rather than a 
battery theory. 30 In those jurisdictions considering an informed con-
sent action under a negligence theory, a doctor can assert the defense 
that the omitted disclosure was not required within his medical 
community.31 In comparison, expert opinion as to community stan-
dards is not a factor in a battery action;. the plaintiff must merely 
prove an injurious touching absent informed consent. 32 Another 
significant difference is that a doctor held liable for punitive damages 
under a battery count might not be covered by his malpractice 
insurance.33 This is not true of an action in ordinary negligence, 
which arguably is the more appropriate theory of liability. 
B. Misrepresentation 
When a person misrepresents a fact to induce another individual 
to act in reliance upon it, the misrepresenting party is liable for any 
injury caused by the other's justifiable reliance.34 Although this form 
of tort action is typically applied in a business setting or where some 
pecuniary loss is claimed, this is not always the case.35 For instance, 
in Kathleen K. v. Robert B.,36 a woman's lover failed to inform her 
that he was infected with the herpes virus. In fact, the plaintiff, 
Kathleen, claimed that Robert assured her that he was free of any 
venereal or other contagious diseases.J7 The California Court of 
Appeals held that the plaintiff's complaint stated a valid cause of 
action in fraud. 38 
29. PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT 118 (1987). 




34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). The elements of an action in 
misrepresentation, also known as fraud or deceit, are: (1) that a false repre-
sentation was made; (2) the representation was known to be false or should 
have been known to be false; (3) the representation was made for the purpose 
of defrauding; (4) the person who was defrauded relied upon the misrepresen-
tation in deciding his action and had a right to so rely; (5) the action taken 
by the person who was defrauded would not have been taken without the 
misrepresentation; and (6) the person suffered harm directly resulting from the 
misrepresentation. Suburban Management v. Johnson, 236 Md. 455, 460, 204 
A.2d 326, 329 (1964). 
35. B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 149, 538 A.2d 1175, 1182 (1988) (finding a 
cognizable cause of action for negligence and fraud when plaintiff alleged that 
she had a romantic relationship with a physician who knew he had herpes but 
did not divulge that information, and, as a result, she contracted the disease). 
36. 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1984). 
37. [d. at 274. 
38. [d. at 276 (holding that consent to sexual intercourse, regardless of whether 
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts also considers the passive 
concealment of facts leading to physical harm to constitute fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 39 The Restatement provides that "[o]ne who by a 
fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a fact that it is his 
duty to disclose, causes physical harm to the person . . . of another 
who justifiably relies upon the misrepresentation, is subject to liability 
to the other."4O 
In B.N. v. K.K.,41 Dr. K, a physician, and Ms. N, a nurse, were 
involved in an intimate relationship. Dr. K knew during the relation-
ship that he had genital herpes, but he never revealed that fact to 
Ms. N.42 Ms. N ultimately was infected.43 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland found that the plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action 
for fraud. 44 The court observed that "concealment cannot be the 
basis of an action in deceit if there is no duty to speak, .... But 
if there is such a duty, the concealment can result in liability to the 
same extent. that an actual denial of the existence of the fact would. "45 
The defendant physician argued that he had no duty to speak and 
warn his lover because there was no marital or other confidential 
relationship between the parties.46 The court, however, concluded 
that where a likelihood of physical harm exists, as it does with a 
communicable disease, "certain tort duties may arise under circum-
stances in which they otherwise would not. "47 
Thus, if a duty to disclose an HIV-positive status is held to 
exist, then a valid argument can be made that a patient infected by 
a physician who failed to disclose an HIV -positive status has a cause 
of action for fraudulent misrepresentation. The failure to disclose 
will satisfy the false representation requirement. The fact that an 
AIDS carrier who is also a health care worker has special training 
in a particular health-related field arguably satisfies the requirement 
that the defrauding person knew or should have known of the falsity 
of his or her representation. In addition, the fact that an AIDS-
carrying health care worker is likely to fail to disclose this status 
because of fear that patients will no longer desire the carrier's services 
partners were married to each other, vitiated claim that partner fraudulently 
concealed the risk of infection with venereal disease). 
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 554, 557A (1977). For instance, a spouse 
who fraudulently conceals from the other spouse a physical condition that 
makes cohabitation dangerous to the health of the other is liable in tort. [d. 
§ 554. 
40. [d. § 557A (emphasis added). 
41. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988). 
42. [d. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1177. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. 
45. [d. at 151, 538 A.2d at 1183. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. at 152, 538 A.2d at 1184. 
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is arguably evidence of an intent to defraud. 48 Finally, a patient who 
contracts AIDS from contact with an HIV -infected physician clearly 
satisfies the harm requirement for an action in fraudulent misrepre-
sentation. 
C. Strict Liability in Tort 
Strict liability is an available cause of action for a person injured 
by a product deemed defective and unreasonably dangerous. The 
focus of this cause of action is not on the negligent conduct, but 
rather on the defective product itself. There is no basis for bringing 
an action against a health care worker under the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, Section 402A, which addresses strict products liability.49 
The doctrine of strict liability is typically used for productsSO and 
recent attempts to apply the doctrine to services have been routinely 
rejected.sl In particular, when professional services are involved, 
courts have uniformly required that negligence be shown and have 
declined to impose strict liability.s2 Therefore, actions brought under 
a strict liability theory for defective health care services will likely 
fail. Although strict liability "promotes the public interest in the 
protection of human life, health, and safety ... [and] is an incentive 
48. A recent Gallup Poll showed that eighty-six percent of those individuals 
surveyed believed that patients should be told if the health care· worker caring 
for them has AIDS. Gostin, supra note 12, at 32 (citing New AHA Guidelines 
Urge Universal AIDS Precautions, 16 MED. STAFF NEWS 2 (1987». It can be 
inferred, therefore, that many patients would choose not to be treated by a 
physician who has AIDS, and, furthermore, that some patients may interpret 
the nondisclosure of an HIV-positive status to mean that a physician does not, 
in fact, have AIDS. . 
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
50. See supra note 11. 
51. For a discussion of cases determining whether the doctrine of strict liability in 
tort, as applied in products liability cases, is applicable to a person or entity 
rendering medical services that are alleged to have resulted in injury to another, 
see, David B. Harrison, Annotation, Application oj Rule oj Strict Liability in 
Tort to Person or Entity Rendering Medical Services, 100 A.L.R.3d 1205 
(1992). 
52. See, e.g., Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 380 (Wis. 1977) (declining to 
impose the doctrine of strict liability to provider of professional medical 
services); see also Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hosp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676 
(Ct. App. 1989) (holding that strict liability does not apply to latent defect in 
hospital room); Podrat v. Codman-Shurtleff, Inc., 558 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989) (finding hospital not strictly liable for patient's injury which 
occurred when a medical instrument broke during surgery as "its use was only 
incidental to the hospital's primary function of providing medical services"); 
Black v. Gundersen Clinic, 448 N.W.2d 247,248 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (holding 
in part that strict liability does not apply to a physician's liability). 
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to safety,"53 no precedent exists to extend the theory to HI V-infected 
health care workers. 
D. Negligence 
Negligence is the cause of action most likely to be successfully 
maintained against an HIV -infected health care worker. The tradi-
tional elements needed to sustain a suit in negligence are: (1) a duty, 
recognized by law, to conform to a certain standard of conduct for 
the protection of others against unreasonable risks; (2) a failure to 
conform to that standard of care - in other words, a breach of that 
duty; (3) a reasonably close causal connection between the conduct 
and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damages to the person 
injured.54 The application of each of these elements to the HIV-
infected health care worker who treats patients will be discussed 
below: 
1. Duty 
A duty is a legally recognized obligation to conform to a certain 
standard of conduct towards another person. 55 A person has a duty 
to refrain from conduct when a reasonable person would know or 
should know that the conduct constitutes an unreasonable risk of 
harm to another .56 With respect to medical malpractice, the first two 
elements of negligence (duty and breach) are defined by the medical 
standard of care owed by the health care worker to the patient; that 
is, "a duty to use that degree of care and skill which is expected of 
a reasonably competent practitioner in the same class to which he 
belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances. "57 Thus, de-
pending on the risk of transmission, a health care worker may have 
a duty to refrain from performing certain procedures, or at least a 
duty to warn the patient of the risks of infection before engaging in 
the medical procedure. 
The central focus in determining whether a duty exists is the 
foreseeability of the risk that someone will be harmed by the health 
53. Hoven, 256 N.W.2d at 391. 
54. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, 
at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984). 
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). 
56. See, e.g., McCance v. Lindau, 63 Md. App. 504, 514, 492 A.2d 1352, 1358 
(1985). 
57. Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp., 276 Md. 187, 200, 349 A.2d 245, 253 
(1975). 
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care worker's activity. 58 In a related situation, "it has been recognized 
by a number of courts that harm to a sexual partner is foreseeable 
when the defendant knows that he has a sexually transmitted dis-
ease."59 In B.N. v. K.K.,60 the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated 
that: 
One who knows he or she has a highly infectious disease 
can readily foresee the danger that the disease may be 
communicated to others with whom the infected person 
comes into contact. As a consequence, the infected person 
has a duty to take reasonable precautions - whether by 
warning others or by avoiding contact with them - to avoid 
transmitting the disease.61 
The ease of transmission of the illness thus becomes a factor. 
AIDS is a communicable disease and, although it is not "highly" 
infectious, it is readily transmissible via blood and other bodily 
fluids. 62 To assess the foreseeability of harm as a result of various 
types of physician/patient contact, it is useful to discuss several 
recent studies examining AIDS transmission and operative risks. 
These studies indicate that following a percutaneous or mucous 
membrane exposure to a patient's HI V-infected blood, there is a risk 
in the range of 0.03 to 0.9 percent that a health care worker will 
contract AIDS.63 There have been no actual studies to quantify the 
58. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976); 
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P .2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1968). The Supreme Court of California 
analyzed foreseeability as follows: 
[T]he Court will determine whether the accident and harm was rea-
sonably foreseeable. Such reasonable foreseeability does not turn on 
whether the particular defendant as an individual would have in 
actuality foreseen the exact accident and loss; it contemplates that 
courts, on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, Will 
decide what the ordinary man under such circumstances should rea-
sonably have foreseen. 
Dillon, 441 P .2d at 921. 
59. Richard C. Schoenstein, Standards of Conduct, Multiple Defendants, and Full 
Recovery of Damages in Tort Liability for the Transmission of Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 52 (1989). 
60. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988). 
61. [d. at 142, 538 A.2d at 1179. 
62. See Edward N. Brandt, Jr., Health Care Workers and AIDS, 48 MD. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1989). 
63. Gostin, supra note 12, at 33 (citing CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, AIDS 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDELINES, NOVEMBER 1982-DECEMBER 19878 (1988». 
See also Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1126-27 (1987»; David 
K. Henderson et aI., Risk for Occupational Transmission of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Type 1 (HIV-I) Associated with Clinical Exposures, 113 
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 740 (1990) (finding the risk for HIV transmission 
296 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 21 
risk in the other direction - from health care worker to patient. 64 
"Physicians performing seriously invasive procedures, such as sur-
geons, have a potential to cut or puncture their- skin with sharp 
surgical instruments, needles or bone fragments. "65 It has been esti-
mated that a surgeon will cut a glove in one out of every four 
procedures66 and will sustain a significant laceration in one out of 
every forty procedures.67 Surgeons who cut themselves, however, do 
not necessarily expose the patient to their blood; even if they do, 
the volume of blood is usually quite small.68 It is known that a small 
inoculum of contaminated blood is unlikely to transmit the virus,69 
but significant and prolonged contact with a patient's blood and 
organs70 probably raises a surgical patient's chances of contracting 
AIDS to 11130,000.71 The cumulative risk to surgical patients, though, 
associated with a percutaneous exposure to blood from an HIV -infected patient 
was approximately .3070 per exposure and the risk associated with occupational 
mucus membrane and cutaneous exposure were likely to be substantively 
smaller). 
64. A number of studies have been performed which looked at HIV-infected 
surgeons and their patients. None of these studies have found any patients 
who were infected by the surgeons and, at the present date, there have been 
no reported cases of any HIV transmission from surgeon to patient. See Jeffrey 
J. Sacks, AIDS in a Surgeon, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1017, 1017-18 (1985) 
(letter to the editor) (stating that as of Aug. 19, 1985 no cases of AIDS had 
been reported in over 400 patients operated on by a Florida surgeon who died 
of AIDS in 1983; of these patients, 20070 had skin procedures, and 80% had 
endoscopic procedures); see also Francis P. Armstrong et al., Investigation oj 
a Health Care Worker with Symptomatic Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
Injection: An Epidemiologic Approach, 152 MILITARY MED. 414, 414-18 (1987) 
(epidemiological investigation found that risk of HIV transmission to a surgical 
patient was essentially non-existent); Ban Mishu et al., A Surgeon with AIDS: 
Lack oj Evidence oj Transmission to Patients, 264 JAMA 467, 467 (1990) 
(stating that no episode of occupational HIV transmission from an infected 
health care worker to a patient has been documented); John D. Porter et al., 
Management oj Patients Treated by Surgeons with HIV Injection, 335 LANCET 
113, 113-14 (Jan. 13, 1990) (based on study of UK surgeon who died of AIDS 
in 1988 and a sampling of seventy-six of his patients tested, authors concluded 
that investigation supported limited previous evidence that during the course 
of surgery, HIV is not readily transmitted between surgeon and patient). 
65. Gostin, supra note 12, at 33. 
66. Id. (citing Peter J .E. Cruse & Rosemary Foord, The Epidemiology oj Wound 
Injection, 60 SURGICAL CLINICS OF N. AM. 27, 35 (1980». 
67. Id. (citing Michael D. Hagen et al., Routine Preoperative Screening Jor HI V: 
Does the Risk to the Surgeon Outweigh the Risk to the Patient?, 259 JAMA 
1357, 1357 (1988». 
68.Id. 
69. Id. (citing Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission oj the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1126-27 (1987». 
70.Id. 
71. Id. However, another recent study found the risk could be even greater. In a 
study performed by David Bell of the Centers for Disease Control and reported 
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may be higher. 72 The HIV -infected surgeon will likely perform nu-
merous operations - and the risk that one of his patients will be 
infected is 1/1300 (assuming 100 operations) or 1/126 (assuming 500 
operations).73 
Thus, there may exist, at a minimum, a duty for those health 
care workers who perform invasive procedures to disclose their 
infection to patients, if not a duty to avoid all intimate contact which 
may foreseeably lead to the transmission of AIDS. "The risk of 
transmission of HIV in the ordinary physician/patient relationship 
where exposure to large amounts of blood is unlikely is too remote 
to be foreseeable. . . . Nevertheless, the risks inherent in seriously 
invasive treatments may well reach the threshold where they become 
relevant to a rational assessment by the patient. "74 
Ultimately, with respect to determining the existence of a duty, 
it is important to bear in mind that "legal duties are not discoverable 
facts of nature, but [are] merely conclusory expressions that, in cases 
of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done. "75 
"[Duty] is not sacrosanct in itself, but [is] only an expression of the 
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to 
say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. "76 A strong 
argument can be made that, in certain health care situations, an 
HIV -infected health care worker has either a duty to refrain from 
performing given procedures or a duty to warn patients of the 
potential risk of HIV transmission. 
2. Breach 
The appropriate standard of conduct by which an individual's 
actions will be measured can be established by legislative enactment, 
administrative regulations or judicial decision. 77 Currently, no legis-
lative enactments exist as to the proper conduct of health care workers 
with AIDS. However, guidelines to prevent HIV-positive health care 
workers from infecting their patients have been promulgated by the 
Centers for Disease Control. 78 These federal guidelines, although not 
at the Seventh International AIDS Conference in Florence, Italy, the risk of 
transmission from an HIV -infected surgeon to a patient was determined to be 
1142,000. See Donald C. Drake, How Patients Got AIDS from Dentist Un-
resolved, BALTIMORE SUN, June 22, 1991, at lA. 
n. Gostin, supra note 12, at 33. 
73.Id. 
74. Id. at 34. 
75. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976). 
76. KEETON, supra note 54, at 332-33. 
77. Schoenstein, supra note 59, at 53. 
78. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of HIV and Hepatitis B 
Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY 
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binding, may be a basis for finding a breach of the standard of care 
in future negligence actions. In the opinion of one author, there 
should be "little doubt that a malpractice case would succeed if 
adequate infection control guidelines [have] not been followed and, 
as a result, HIV was transmitted to the patient. "79 
It is only a matter of time before the proper standard of care 
is established. In the meantime, a statement from the American 
Medical Association provides fodder for those who ultimately will 
decide what constitutes a breach of a health care worker's duty of 
care: 
a physician who knows that he or she has an infectious 
disease should not engage in any activity that creates a risk 
of transmission of the disease to others . . . . [P]atients are 
entitled to expect that their physicians will not increase their 
exposure to the risk of contracting an infectious disease, 
even minimally. 80 
Which activities constitute at least a minimal risk remains to be 
determined. 
3. Causation and Damages 
The final two elements of an action in negligence apply with 
equal force to cases involving HIV -positive health care workers as 
they do to ordinary negligence cases. First, the defendant's conduct 
must be the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the injury. 
Presently, DNA studies allow for relatively accurate determinations 
of the source of the AIDS virus.81 Thus, whether the named health 
& MORTALITY WKLY. REp. I, 1-9 (Supp. RR-8 1991). These recommendations 
provide, inter alia, that all health care workers should adhere to universal 
precautions; that there is no basis to restrict HIV-infected health care workers 
from performing non-exposure prone invasive pro~edures; that health care 
workers performing exposure-prone procedures should know their HIV status; 
and that a health care worker who is HIV -positive should discontinue perform-
ing invasive procedures unless the prospective patient is notified and a review 
panel approves. Id. 
Also, the American Medical Association has stated that "physicians who 
are HI V-positive have an ethical obligation not to engage in any professional 
activity which has an identifiable risk of transmission of the infection to the 
patient." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMA STATEMENT ON HIV-IN-
FECTED PHYSICIANS (1991). But see Lawrence K. Altman, Medical Groups Resist 
Call For AIDS Guidelines, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 30, 1991, at lA (reporting 
that most medical groups at an AMA meeting found "that the risk of 
transmission from health care worker to patient was so low that compiling 
lists of high-risk procedures was worthless"). 
79. Gostin, supra note 12, at 34. 
80. Id. (citing American Medical Association, Report of the Council on Ethical 
and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues Involved in the Growing AIDS Crisis, 259 
JAMA 1360 (1988». 
81. See Andrea DeGorgey, Note and Comment: The Advent 0/ DNA Databanks 
- Implications for In/ormation Privacy, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 381, 382 (1990). 
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care worker exposed the victim to AIDS can often be determined by 
chemical analysis of the viruses isolated in the infected party's blood.82 
Second, the required damages from infection with AIDS are obvious. 
While the symptoms of AIDS are often slow to appear, the effects 
are devastating, costly, and in all cases, fatal. 
E. The Duty to Disclose. 
1. Negligence versus Confidentiality 
The failure to disclose information in certain situations may be 
an act of negligence. Generally, "[a]n individual has no common 
law duty to warn innocent others of the existence of danger unless 
that individual is responsible for the creation of the danger. "83 A 
physician with AIDS, however, is responsible for the creation of the 
danger of infection, and, as a member of the medical profession, 
has a responsibility to prevent the spread of contagious diseases. 84 In 
addition, "[i]t generally is recognized that once a physician diagnoses 
a contagious disease it is the physician's duty to use reasonable care 
to advise members of the patient's immediate family of the existence 
of the disease and to warn them of its dangers. "85 
It follows that a physician with a contagious disease should use 
reasonable care to advise his patients of his disease and the danger 
of exposure. The adequacy of a health care worker's conduct in 
failing to warn of the danger of transmission of AIDS "must be 
\' measured against the traditional negligence standard of the rendition 
of reasonable care under the circumstances.' '86 
"[D]ue care normally demands that the physician warn the 
patient of any risks to his well-being which contemplated therapy 
may involve. "87 Nonfulfillment of this obligation to disclose is a 
breach of duty which does not by itself, however, establish liability 
to the patient. 88 "An unrevealed risk that should have been made 
known must materialize, for otherwise the omission, however unpar-
donable, is legally without consequence. "89 In addition, there must 
82. See DeGorgey, supra note 81, at 382. 
83. Judith C. Ensor, Doctor - Patient Confidentiality Versus Duty to Warn in the 
Context of AIDS Patients and their Partners, 47 MD. L. REV. 675, 680 (1988). 
84. Ensor, supra note 83, at 682. 
85. Id. at 682-83 (citing Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1970». 
86. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976). 
, 87. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
1064 (1972). 
88. Id. at 790. 
89.Id. 
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be a causal relationship between the failure to disclose and the 
resultant damage to the patient. 90 
The requirement for disclosure of an HIV -positive status raises 
the issue of confidentiality. It has been argued that confidentiality 
concerns may mitigate, or be in opposition to, the duty to disclose. 
In Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Calijornia,91 a patient killed 
a certain young woman after informing his therapist of his intention 
to do so. The therapist did not reveal the conversation because of 
the confidential nature of the physician/patient relationship.92 The 
Court of Appeals of California found that a cause of action existed 
for failing to disclose this information to the victim.93 
Tarasoff has been regarded as persuasive in the analogous situ-
ation of a physician's duty to disclose his patient's HIV-positive 
status to the patient's sexual and needle-sharing partners.94 Thus, in 
certain situations, confidentiality concerns are outweighed by matters 
of life and death. 
Problems of confidentiality are not limited to those within the 
physician/patient relationship, but are a factor when anyone has 
AIDS - including health care workers. The stigma of AIDS makes 
the disclosure by a health care worker that he or she has the disease 
very likely to ruin their career. Thus, health care workers may be 
prevented from performing even those healing activities from which 
there is absolutely no risk of infection. This concern for the health 
care worker's career, in itself, however, cannot justify taking the 
ultimate decision away from the patient. Thus, the duty to disclose 
one's HIV status arguably is not outweighed by confidentiality con-
cerns. 
2. Disclosure Law in the Medical Setting - Informed Consent 
A physician's duty to disclose -information to patients about 
alternative treatments and the risks of therapy is often termed the 
90. [d. Although courts agree that there must be this causal relationship, there is 
disagreement on whether an objective or subjective approach to determine 
causation should be applied. Under the objective standard, as applied in 
Canterbury, the causal link exists if a reasonable person in the patient's position 
who was adequately informed of all significant perils would have opted not to 
undergo the therapy. [d. at 791. Other courts, although probably in the 
minority, use a subjective standard for determining causation. That is, if the 
particular patient would not have consented to the treatment, after full disclo-
sure, whether or not it is a reasonable choice, then the causal link exists. See 
Arena v. Gingrich, 733 P.2d 75, 76-78 (Or. Ct. App.), aff'd, 748 P.2d 547 
(Or. 1987). 
91. 551 P .2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
92. [d. at 340. 
93. [d. 
94. See Ensor, supra note 83, at 684-89. 
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doctrine of "informed consent. "95 This doctrine imposes on a phy-
sician the responsibility to warn the patient of any material risks or 
dangers inherent in or collateral to the therapy. 96 Included in this 
obligation is the duty to warn of the "risk of unfortunate conse-
quences associated with such treatment."97 The transmission of a 
communicable disease during physician/patient contact is assuredly 
an unfortunate consequence of treatment; although not inherent to 
therapy, it is a collateral result. 
Judge Cardozo perhaps best described the essence of the in-
formed consent doctrine almost eighty years ago when he stated: 
"[e]very human being ... has a right to determine what shall be 
done with his own body."98 "A physician violates his duty to his 
patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts 
which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by 
the patient."99 
In Canterbury v. Spence,loo the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia refined the modern standards for medical 
disclosure. In that case, a young man whose only symptom was back 
pain submitted to an operation without being informed of the risks 
of paralysis from the procedure}OI According to the physician's 
testimony, paralysis could be expected "somewhere in the nature of 
one percent" for that type of surgery}02 The doctor felt that inform-
ing the patient of that risk was "not good medical practice because 
it might deter patients from undergoing needed surgery and might 
produce adverse psychological reactions which could preclude the 
success of the operation. "103 
The court, however, concluded that "the appropriate test is not 
what the physician . . . thinks a patient should know before acqui-
escing in a proposed course of treatment; rather, the focus is on 
what data the patient requires in order to make an intelligent deci-
sion."I04 As the Canterbury court expressed: "To the physician, 
95. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 7S0 n.15 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 1064 (1972). 
96. Sard v. Hardy, 2S1 Md. 432, 439, 379 A.2d 1014, 1020 (1977). 
97. [d. 
9S. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled 
on other grounds by, Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). 
99. Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, lSI (Cal. 
1957). . 
100. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). 
101. [d. at 776. 
102. [d. at 778. 
103. [d. 
104. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432,442,379 A.2d 1014, 1021 (1977) (citing Canterbury 
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972»; 
see also Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 559 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1973). 
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whose training enables a self-satisfying evaluation, the answer may 
seem clear, but it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, 
to determine for himself the direction in which his interests seem to 
lie." lOS If the risk is not paralysis, but rather infection via the 
physician, it still would be the patient's decision to determine the 
importance of this risk and to decide whether or not to undergo the 
proposed treatment. . 
The risk of acquiring AIDS, even in invasive procedures, is less 
than the one percent risk of paralysis for the back operation described 
in Canterbury. 106 A physician need not disclose every potential risk 
to a patient no matter how small or remote. loo What, then, is the 
scope of the data which must be revealed to a patient? "[T]he test 
for determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its 
materiality to the patient's decision: all risks potentially affecting the 
decision must be unmasked.' '108 "[A] risk is . . . material when a 
reasonable person . . . would be likely to attach significance to the 
risk . . . in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed ther-
apy."I09 
As previously stated, a large majority (86070) of individuals feel 
that a physician's infection with AIDS is something which should be 
disclosed to the patient. 110 It follows that the risk of HIV transmission 
from physician to patient is a material one, as a person's decision 
would be affected by his doctor's HIV-positive status. Though the 
probability of harm is small, the degree of harm threatened by AIDS 
is great; even a very small chance of death may be material and 
deserving of disclosure. ll1 Thus, although there is only a slight risk 
of HIV transmission from physician to patient, there may well be a 
duty to disclose this risk in all circumstances. 
Causation is often a difficult element to prove in an informed 
consent claim. The issue is framed as whether the plaintiff would 
have chosen another alternative had the material risk been disclosed. 
It is easy for a patient or the next of kin to testify retrospectively 
that, where there was an adverse result, the patient would have opted 
for another alternative or would have foregone the procedure. Unless 
one can objectively conclude what a reasonably prudent person would 
have done under the same circumstances, the informed consent case 
105. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 781. 
106. Gostin, supra note 12, at 33. 
107. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786. 
108. Id. at 786-87. 
109. Id. at 787 (quoting John R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed 
Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 628, 640 (1970». 
110. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 32 (citing New AHA Guidelines Urge Universal 
AIDS Precautions, 16 MilD. STAFF NEWS 2 (1987». 
111. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788. 
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will fail. But, in a case of transmission of AIDS from patient to 
health care worker, it appears that a fact-finder could easily come 
to the conclusion that, given the choice between having an operation 
performed by an HIV-infected physician and a non-infected physi-
cian, the patient would opt for the latter. 
F. Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
One who infects another with a disease or causes a fear of 
infection can be liable for the resulting emotional distress. 1I2 Thus, 
a health care worker who transmits HIV to a patient could potentially 
be responsible for the resulting emotional distress. Similarly, there 
may be a justifiable cause of action for emotional distress by those 
who are not even infected; a patient treated by an HIV -infected 
health care worker may suffer emotional distress caused by the fear 
of being infected.113 This is because HIV can remain undetected in 
the human body for up to 14 months.1I4 Thus, "a person exposed 
to HIV ... may have a cause of action for his past fear during the 
14-month interlude between the person's exposure to HIV and the 
person's discovery that he does not carry HIV."lIs 
Damages for the infliction of emotional distress may be sought 
under theories of intentional tort or under a negligence count. In 
order for there to be a cause of action for the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress there must be intentional or reckless conduct 
which is extreme and outrageous and which causes severe emotional 
distress. 1I6 It would be an unusual case where a health care worker 
would be successfully charged with this legal action. Hypothetically, 
if a physician or dentist were to operate without adequate protection 
and with open lesions, this action might be successful. There would 
be adequate intent, as the health care worker would be acting 
"recklessly in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability 
that the emotional distress [would] follow. "117 The characteristics of 
the illness would indicate the extreme and outrageous nature of the 
112. John P. Darby, Tort Liability for the Transmission of the AIDS Virus: Damages 
for Fear of AIDS and Prospective AIDS, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185 (1988). 
113. Darby, supra note 112, at 197. 
114. Michael Specter, AIDS Tests Can Fail to Detect Infection for More Than Year, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1987, at At. However, in 95070 of those infected with 
HIV, antibody tests will give a positive result within six months of the 
transmission of the virus. C. Robert Horsburgh, Jr., et aI., Duration of Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Before Detection of Antibody, LANCET, Sept. 
16, 1989, at 637. 
115. Darby, supra note 112, at 197. 
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). 
117. B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 144, 538 A.2d 1175, 1180 (1988) (citing Harris v. 
Jones, 281 Md. 560, 567, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977». 
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health care worker's conduct. lls Thus, if severe emotional distress 
results from the health care worker's actions, there may be a justi-
fiable claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The 
occasions supporting this cause of action, however, will be exceed-
ingly rare. 
Claims for negligently inflicted emotional distress resulting from 
contacts by HIV-infected physicians are more likely to be successful. 
One limitation in these cases, however, is that most courts hold that 
a plaintiff cannot recover damages for mental distress in a negligence 
action without a physical injury.ll9 "Courts adhering to the physical 
injury requirement will not allow a plaintiff to recover damages for 
mental injury without objective physical evidence that the plaintiff 
has suffered an injury." 120 
The courts, however, have substantially lowered the threshold 
requirement of physical injury. 121 The plaintiff's physical harm does 
not necessarily have to result directly from the negligent party's 
physical contact or impact; indeed, physical harm resulting from the 
emotional stress which was caused by the contact will satisfy the 
physical injury requirement. 122 
In Plummer v. United States,123 prisoners sought to recover for 
their emotional distress caused by their exposure during incarceration 
to another prisoner with tuberculosis. The plaintiffs suffered no 
symptoms of the disease, but their bodies did harbor, in a dormant 
state, tubercle bacilli - the organisms which cause tuberculosis.124 This 
"impact" of the bacteriologic agent, absent any symptoms, was 
considered an adequate physical injury.12S Similarly, a patient who is 
infected with HIV will have been impacted; the infection alone 
comprises a sufficient physical injury to allow for recovery, but only 
if the other requirements fpr emotional distress are met. 
118. Id. 
119. KEETON, supra note 54, at 361. A small number of courts allow recovery for 
the negligent infliction of emotional distress standing alone, without any 
requirement that the plaintiff suffer physical injury or illness from the negli-
gence. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). 
120. Darby, supra note 112, at 193 n.33 (citing Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 
171, 181 (Mass. 1982». 
121. See Apostle v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 897, 901 (N.D. Mich. 
1983) (finding that courts have been "very lenient" in requiring a definite and 
objective physical injury). 
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(1) (1965); see Vance v. Vance, 286 
Md. 490, 500, 408 A.2d 728, 733-34 (1979) (finding that in most jurisdictions 
"the term 'physical' is not used in its ordinary dictionary sense ... [i]nstead, 
it is used to represent that the injury for which recovery is sought is capable 
of objective determination"). 
123. 580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1978). 
124. Id. at 73. 
125. Id. at 76. 
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It is more difficult, however, to show physical injury when no 
actual infection with HIV has occurred during the health care worker / 
patient interaction but the patient, nevertheless, sues for fear of 
having acquired AIDS. In an analogous case, Laxton v. Orkin 
Exterminating Company, Inc., 126 the plaintiff family's water supply 
was negligently contaminated with a carcinogen. One month after 
the plaintiffs became aware of the dangers of the exposure, test 
results proved that the chemical had no adverse effects on any 
mem ber of the family. 127 Even though no one suffered physical 
damage from the exposure, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded 
that drinking polluted water was sufficient injury to justify an award 
for mental anguish.\28 
It can be argued that "[u]nder the court's analysis in Laxton, 
an uninfected person who was exposed to HIV should be able to 
recover for the fear of AIDS the person suffered before discovering 
that he did not carry HIV."129 For those patients who are operated 
on by an HIV-infected physician, perhaps the surgical procedure 
itself would constitute the requisite physical impact or injury without 
the necessity of actual infection with the AIDS virus. This conclusion 
would be akin to finding a physical injury from mere contact with 
dangerous water alone, with no evidence that carcinogens had an 
impact on the plaintiffs. 130 
Two recent opinions by Judge Joseph H. H. Kaplan of the 
Circuit Court of Baltimore City, however, are not in agreement with 
this reasoning. 131 These unreported companion cases involved two 
law suits filed by patients who were afraid that they had contracted 
AIDS after undergoing surgery by a well-known Johns Hopkins 
breast cancer surgeon, Dr. Rudolph Almaraz, who later died of 
AIDS.\32 The patients did not test positive for the virus, but sued 
for the "panic, horror, and fear" which ensued until the tesi results 
proved negative. \33 
126. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982). 
127. Id. at 433. 
128. Id. at 434. 
129. Darby. supra note 112, at 199. 
130. Laxton, 639 S.W.2d at 434. 
131. Rossi v. Estate of Almaraz, No. 90344028, CLl23396 (Balto. City Cir. Ct. 
May 23, 1991); Faya v. Estate of Almaraz, No. 90345011, CLl23459 (Balto. 
City Cir. Ct. May 23, 1991). 
132. Rossi, No. 90344028, CLl23396, slip op. at 1; Faya, No. 90345011, CLl23459, 
slip op. at 1. 
133. See Liz Bowie, Baltimore Judge Dismisses Suits on Fear oj AIDS, BALTIMORE 
SUN, May 24, 1991, at lA; Raymond L. Sanchez, Suits Based on AIDS Fear 
Dismissed: Judge Voids Claims Sparked by AIDS-Injected Surgeon, BALTIMORE 
EVENING SUN, May 24, 1991, at AI. 
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In both cases, the patients underwent surgery at least one year 
before Dr. Almaraz's death. 134 After learning that their surgeon had 
died of AIDS, both patients were tested for HIV and the results 
proved negative. 135 Thus, for a very short period of time, both may 
have been in fear of having acquired HIV. 
Judge Kaplan relied upon Burk v. Sage Products, Inc.,136 in 
)Vhich a paramedic sued the manufacturer of a disposal device for 
used syringes. 137 The paramedic was stuck by a protruding needle but 
was unable to show that the needle was actually used on an AIDS 
patient. 138 The plaintiff subsequently proved to be uninfected with 
HIV and the Burk court ruled that he could not recover for his fear 
of exposure to AIDS}39 The court concluded that "while injuries 
stemming from a fear of contracting illness after exposure to a 
disease-causing agent may present compensable damages, injuries 
stemming from fear of the initial exposure do not." 140 
In the Almaraz cases, the court concluded that no recovery for 
fear of exposure to AIDS should be allowed since the plaintiffs were 
unable to allege sufficient facts to support their allegations that they 
were exposed to AIDS in the first place. 141 The judge dismissed the 
cases on the rationale that no accident had happened during the 
surgeries that would lead the plaintiffs to believe the doctor's blood 
had entered their bodies. 142 
In the absence of such a mishap, Judge Kaplan reasoned, actual 
exposure to AIDS was very unlikely. The court believed that, as a 
matter of law, there was not enough evidence on which a fact-finder 
could . conclude that the plaintiffs had been exposed to the AIDS 
virus. The court reasoned that "the injury claimed by the plaintiff[s] 
is the fear that something that did not happen could have hap-
pened. "143 
These cases can be distinguished from another Maryland case, 
Bressler v. Hyatt Hotel Corp. ,144 where the federal court indicated it 
134. Rossi, No. 90344028, CL123396, slip op. at I; Faya, No. 90345011, CL123459, 
slip op. at l. 
135. Rossi, No. 90344028, CL123396, slip op. at I; Faya, No. 90345011, CLI23459, 
slip op. at l. 
136. 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
137. Rossi, No. 90344028, CL123396, slip op. at 6; Faya, No. 90345011, CL123459, 
slip op. at 6. 
138. Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 287. 
139. [d. at 288. 
140. [d. 
14l. Rossi, No. 90344028, CL123396, slip op. at 9; Faya, No. 90345011, CL123459, 
slip op. at 8. 
142. Rossi, No. 90344028, CL123396, slip op. at 9; Faya, No. 90345011, CL123459, 
slip op. at 9. 
143. Faya, No. 90345011, CL123459, slip op. at 9. 
144. No. 90-1071 (D. Md. Apr. 17, 1990). 
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would allow the jury to consider damages for the fear of contracting 
AIDS. The plaintiff in that case, a hotel guest, was stuck by a needle 
left in his bed. The previous night, the room had been used by a 
number of intravenous drug users. There the plaintiff learned of his 
potential exposure immediately, as it is well known that one of the 
most common ways for transmission of the HIV virus is through the 
used needle of an intravenous drug user. The plaintiff then was 
tested for the virus every ninety days for a year and postponed 
having a family with his wife during that time. Thus, a major 
distinction between Almaraz and Bressler would appear to be that in 
the Almaraz cases, a year passed by the time the plaintiffs became 
aware of the potential exposure to HIV; in Bressler, however, the 
plaintiff became aware of the potential exposure immediately and 
had to undergo a year of testing to determine the results. 
Recovery by a patient for fear of exposure to AIDS, then, seems 
to require proof of contact with the infected physician's blood - a 
level of proof not likely to be sustainable by a pC\tient in most 
operative situations. There must be proof of "impact" with the 
AIDS-causing agent (i.e., infected blood), and proof that there was 
an objective, reasonable basis for the fear of contracting AIDS. 
The second requirement for recovery of damages for emotional 
distress, that the plaintiff's fear of the disease be reasonable,145 has 
been analogized to situations where a defendant has exposed a 
plaintiff to a carcinogen. l46 In such a case, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that "a plaintiff is entitled 
to recover damages for serious mental distress arising from fear of 
developing cancer where his fear is reasonable and causally related 
to the defendant's negligence."147 Further, "[w)hether the emotional 
distress which a plaintiff is alleged to have experienced is reasonable, 
is to be determined by the finder of fact." 148 It is worthwhile to note 
that a plaintiff's fear of a future disease may be reasonable even if 
the chance of developing the disease is low. 149 
145. Darby, supra note 112, at 193. 
146. Id. at 188. 
147. Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1986). 
148. Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (Mass. 1982). 
149. See, e.g., Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 468 (5th Cir. 1985). A 
Maryland case comparable and instructive on this issue deals with recovery for 
fear of rabies after a dog bite. Buck v. Brady, 110 Md. 568, 73 A. 277 (1909). 
That case essentially held that recovery for fear of rabies was permissible where 
there was a reasonable basis for it - that is, where there was evidence that the 
biting dog was afflicted with hydrophobia. 110 Md. at 578, 73 A. at 277, 281. 
It was on the basis of that case that Judge Marshall A. Levin allowed recovery 
for fear of cancer in the recent asbestos cases. In re Baltimore City Personal 
Injury & Wrongful Death Asbestos Cases, Cain v. Eagle Picher Indus., Inc., 
Case Nos. 85056065 and 843139072 (Balto. City Cir. Ct. May 7, 1990) (mem-
orandum opinion and order). 
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In the Almaraz cases, there was at most only a period of a few 
weeks from the patients' initial realization that their doctor had 
AIDS, until they were proved to be uninfected. 150 Because over one 
year had passed since the intimate physician/patient contact, the 
finding of their HIV - seronegativity put an end to any claim the 
patients may have had for fear of AIDS in the future. 151 It can easily 
be concluded that it is not reasonable that either plaintiff suffered 
severe emotional distress in those few days before knowing of their 
favorable HIV test results. 
In summary, if a negligence action against a physician for failure 
to disclose his HIV status is upheld, then recovery of damages for 
emotional distress should be allowed as well where there is objective 
evidence for the reasonableness of the fear. This undoubtedly should 
be the conclusion if the patient actually contracts AIDS and suffers 
the concomitant emotional pitfalls. Additionally, recovery for the 
fear of having been infected when no infection actually occurred 
may also be allowable for the severe emotional distress which results 
until an HIV test definitively proves that the fear is no longer 
reasonable. 
III. CONCLUSION 
AIDS is a terrible disease which currently has no cure. Unfor-
tunately, there are no simple solutions for the legal problems it 
creates. As the epidemic matures, more and more situations like the 
ones discussed will occur and real answers need to be developed. 
Health care workers who infect their patients with HIV need to 
be held accountable for their actions. This accountability is necessary 
if the interest of preserving life - the ultimate reason for health care 
- is to be furthered. 152 The requirement for a warning as to the health 
ISO. Rossi v. Estate of Almaraz, No. 90344028, CLl23396 (Balto. City Cir. Ct. 
May 23, 1991); Faya v. Estate of Almaraz, No. 90345011, CLl23459 (Balto. 
City Cir. Ct. May 23, 1991). 
151. See Darby, supra note 112, at 197. 
152. As a poignant reminder to this, consider the letter written (but never sent) by 
Kimberly Bergalis to an investigator with Florida's Department of Health and 
Rehabilitative Services. Ms. Bergalis was one of five patients infected by a 
Florida dentist, Dr. David Acer, during a routine dental procedure. The letter 
states: 
AIDS has slowly destroyed me. Unless a cure is found, I will be 
another one of your statistics soon. Whom do I blame? Do I blame 
myself? I sure don't. I never used IV drugs, never slept with anyone 
and never had a blood transfusion. I blame Dr. Acer and every single 
one of you bastards. Anyone who knew Dr. Acer was infected and 
had full-blown AIDS and stood by not doing a damn thing about it. 
You are all just as guilty as he was. You've ruined my life and my 
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care worker's HIV status can help bring about this end. This should 
only be done, however, where the purpose of preserving life can 
truly be facilitated. Thus, for example, a psychiatrist, a physical 
therapist, a pathologist, or an optometrist will likely never need to 
disclose their HIV status. Further, a radiologist, internist, or der-
. matologist may rarely perform invasive procedures, and thus, their 
duty to disclose may be limited. It is completely the opposite situa-
tion, however, for an endodontist, orthopedist, operating room nurse 
or general surgeon, as they may rarely perform non-invasive proce-
dures. It is for them that the duty to disclose is most onerous, for 
this disclosure can be career-ending. Nevertheless, the failure to 
disclose may have catastrophic consequences for the patient - hence, 
disclosure in those cases where risk of HIV -transmission exists should 
be mandated and failure to disclose should be actionable. 
IV. ADDENDUM 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland decided the Almaraz cases 
on March 9, 1993.1S3 The court of appeals concluded that the lower 
court decision dismissing these lawsuits before trial was incorrect. 
The court was "unable to say, as a matter of law, that Dr. Almaraz 
family's. 
I have lived to see my hair fallout, my body lose over 40 pounds, 
blisters on my sides. I've lived to go through nausea and vomiting, 
continual night sweats. . . . I have lived through the torturous acne 
that infested my face and neck - brought on by AZT. I have endured 
trips twice a week to Miami for three months only to receive painful 
IV injections .... I cried my heart out from the pain .... I lived to 
see white fungus grow all over the inside of my mouth, the back of 
my throat, my gums, and now my lips. I have it on my tongue .... 
Can you imagine what it's like to realize you're losing weight in your 
fingers and that your body may be using its muscles to try to survive. 
Or do you know what it's like to look at yourself in a full-length 
mirror before you shower - and you only see a skeleton? Do you 
know what I did? I slid to the floor and I cried. Now I shower with 
a blanket over the mirror. . . . 
[A]ll is forgiven by me - there's no more hard feelings anymore. But 
I will never forget. 
P .S. If laws are not formed to provide protection, then my suffering 
and death was in vain. I'm dying guys. Goodbye. 
Florida AIDS Victim Injected by Dentist Vents Ire, BALTIMORE SUN, June 21, 
1991, at lA; Tim Golden, Dental Patient Torn by AIDS Calls jor Lows, N.Y. 
TIMEs, June 22, 1991, at L7. Ms. Bergalis' malpractice action against Dr. Acer 
was settled out of court for one million dollars. See $1 Million Is A warded to 
Patient with AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1991, at A14. Ms. Bergalis died from 
AIDS on December 8, 1991, at the age of twenty-three. Id. 
153. Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993) (deciding the appeals of 
Rossi and Faya). 
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owed no duty to the Appellants either to refrain from performing 
the surgery or to warn them of his condition. "154 
The decision allows injured parties to recover only "for their 
fear and its physical manifestations which may have resulted from 
Almaraz's alleged negligence for the period constituting their reason-
able window of anxiety - the period between which they learned of 
Almaraz's illness and received their HIV negative status. "155 Damages 
are therefore confined to injuries suffered during this "window of 
anxiety," after which "any lingering injuries, as a matter of law, 
are no longer related to fear that is reasonable. "156 
This is essentially the same approach that Judge Garbis utilized 
in Bressler. 157 In the Bressler case, the reasonable window of anxiety 
was determined to be one year. In the Almaraz cases, however, since 
more than a year had passed since the exposure when the plaintiffs 
learned that Dr. Almaraz had been infected with HIV, the period of 
anxiety was limited to approximately one week l58 - the time from 
finding out about Dr. Almaraz's HIV status to the time test results 
could be available. The court of appeals thereby took a less restrictive 
approach than Judge Kaplan, but nevertheless imposed limitations 
along the lines suggested in Bressler. 
154. Id. at 448, 620 A.2d at 333. 
155. Id. at 455-56, 620 A.2d at 337. The "window of anxiety" appears to close 
once fear-relieving information becomes available or could have become avail-
able. See id. at 456 n.l0, 620 A.2d at 337 n.lO. 
156. Id. at 459, 620 A.2d at 338-39. 
157. Bressler v. Hyatt Hotel Corp., No. 90-1071 (D. Md. Apr. 17, 1990). 
158. Cathy Hinebaugh, Distress Damages Recognized In AIDS Cases Against Doc-
tors, DAILY REc., Mar. 10, 1993, at 1, 7. 
